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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the court concluded that, absent a clearer legislative pronouncement,
it would not decide that the amendment to Vehicle & Traffic Law
section 253 was intended to waive the residency requirements of the
county courts with regard to non-resident motorists. Thus, although
section 253 may be utilized to effect service upon a non-resident, the
residential prerequisites of the court seeking jurisdiction must also be
satisfied.
REAL PROPERTY AcTIoNs AND PROCEEDINGS LAW

RLPAPL 755: "Abuse of process" recognized as an actionable tort.
Delay in the final disposition of cases both criminal and civil has
plagued the judicial process in New York. In civil actions, a party
often delays in the hope that his adversary will concede out of despair.
Illustrative of this is 500 West 174 Street v. Vasquez,23 7 where the Civil
Court, New York County, condemned this tactic in no uncertain terms.
In Vasquez, the tenant requested in 1968 that certain repairs to
his apartment be made, but the landlord ignored this request. In
January 1970, the tenant stopped paying rent; in June 1970, the landlord commenced nonpayment proceedings. The tenant then sought
relief under section 755 of the RPAPL. 238 Both the landlord and his
attorney continually failed to appear in court, but recommenced proceedings five times. 239 On the various calendar dates, the tenant, who
had to close his one-man grocery store to go to court, appeared at least
2 40
nine of ten times; the landlord appeared only once.
The court deemed the unconscionable conduct of the landlord a
tort designated "abuse of process, 2 41 fixing damages at $1,000. Additionally, the landlord's attorney's behavior was referred by the court
to the Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar.2 42 Thus,
landlords were warned that misuse of process may be costly, and lawyers who aid in such unethical practices were put on notice that they
will be subject to disciplinary proceedings.
237 67 Misc. 2d 993, 325 N.YS.2d 256 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).

238 Id. at 994, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
239 The landlord commenced non-payment proceedings in June 1970, November 1970,
December 1970, June 1971, and July 1971. Id. at 995-96, 325 N.YS.2d at 257-58.
240 Id. at 996, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
241 Id. at 995, 825 N.YS.2d at 258. In discussing "abuse of process," Dean Prosser
states:
]he gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing process to issue
without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for
an end other than that which it was designated to accomplish.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF Totrs 856 (4th ed. 1971). See also Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 870,
7 N.E,2d 268, reargttment denied, 274 N.Y. 489, 8 N.E.2d 617 (1937).
242 67 Misc. 2d at 996, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 259. The landlord failed to appear in court
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VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW

Vehicle & Traffic § 388: Benefit of taxicab owner's policy does not inure
to passengerwho was user within meaning of statute but who was excluded from coverage by the terms of the policy.
Kernon v. Shamrock Casualty Co.248 reaffirms the long standing
rule permitting passenger carrier owners to limit their insurance coverage for liability to themselves and the operators of the vehicle. Section
388 imposes liability on the owner of a vehicle for negligence in the
use or operation thereof and requires the owner's policy to provide
indemnity against such liability.244 In Kernon, however, the policy
issued by the defendant to the taxicab owner was in accordance with
the limiting language of section 370,245 which only requires coverage
for the operation and not the use of a passenger carrier.
The plaintiff, while a passenger in the taxicab, negligently opened
the door into the path of another motorist. The latter sued passenger
Kernon and she in turn lodged this third-party complaint against the
insurer of the taxicab owner. The court had little difficulty establishing that Kernon was a user of the vehicle and thus within the statutory
coverage of section 388.246 It follows that a valid suit in negligence
could have been brought against the taxicab owner's insurer by the
motorist.
The peculiarity of this case is that the motorist chose to sue only
Kernon. Since the owner's policy covered him and the operators of the
vehicle, the court concluded that Kernon, as a user of the taxicab,
was an uninsured and had to defend the suit herself. 247 The court rejected the contention that section 388 projected coverage for the user
248
of the vehicle into the policy.
Under a literal construction of section 370, the court's decision is
correct. However, a liberal reading of that section to include a user
of the vehicle as an operator would perhaps be more consistent with
the policy of public protection which the statute seeks to engender.
This is especially so in the present case where by mere matter of choice
the burden falls on the party less able to afford it.
and gave no explanation for this failure. The court stated that the attorney's behavior
might well be tortious and violative of the canons of professional ethics.
243 68 Misc. 2d 29, 326 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
244 N.Y. VE-,. & TRAF. LAw § 388 (McKinney 1970).
245 Id. § 870(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
246 68 Misc. 2d at 30, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 138 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
247 Id. at 31, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
248 Id., citing General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Piazza, 4 N.Y.2d 659,
152 N.E.2d 236, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958).

